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Security issues have been under the spotlight on a daily basis
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers, which—aired
on live TV—were witnessed by millions of people around the
globe. This has been accompanied by the increased availability
(and leakage) of security information on the Internet, the increase
in public awareness over related issues, and the surge of eth-
ical debates on the possible ethical and legal consequences of
“security states”; security has taken priority in political agendas,
academic debates, and research funding—the security industry
is thriving. Against this background, more and more academics
are exploring ways to contribute to the debate, and to inform
and influence security decision making. This is both a chal-
lenging and a rewarding enterprise and neuroscience promises
game-changing innovations.
Security science however is a multidisciplinary field, where
physics and engineering, computer science and biology, psychol-
ogy and medicine, pharmacology and neuroscience, philosophy
and jurisprudence, sociology and ethology can all bring valuable
contributions to the table. Accordingly, in this Research Topic we
have hosted relevant contributions from neuroscience and psy-
chology experts but also dipped into other disciplines such as
engineering, physics, computer science, crime science, jurispru-
dence, and sociology of science. We would like to thank all of
the authors and the reviewers for their excellent contributions
and their effort in spanning disciplinary boundaries. It is not easy
to strike the right balance between expertise and accessibility, to
explore a little further outside of our comfort niche and convey
meaning to a multifaceted type of readership, such as the one
that can be reached via open access and via Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience in particular. We hope that our Research Topic will
provide a useful contribution to the dialog among disciplines
on security-related issues and also a successful example of how
the—often artificial—disciplinary boundaries can be challenged.
Almost every aspect of security is inextricably connected
with technology. One of the aspects where accelerated advance-
ments have been witnessed in recent years is the incorporation
of psychological and physiological measures via new technolo-
gies. Reviews of the area of biometrics, traditionally described
as the identification of individuals (or their emotional states)
using physiological and behavioral characteristics, such as finger
prints, iris or retinal patterns, facial features, handwriting or typ-
ing on a keyboard (see Ahmad et al., 2013), to name but a few,
and the uses of sophisticated imaging techniques, such as fMRI
to detect indicators of deception (see Rusconi and Mitchener-
Nissen, 2013; Vartanian et al., 2013), provide two representative
examples of this. The ethical and legal aspects of the use of
such technologies are widespread. One the one hand, the data
gathered with such technology are challenging to process and
interpret, so this bears the question as to how clearly experts
can present their evidence to a jury in the context of criminal
justice systems; on the other hand, findings based on the use
of the technology are still far from being fully reliable, research
based on laboratory experiments restricts the ecological valid-
ity of such measures, and the complexity and sensitivity of the
technology makes it difficult to run trials outside the labora-
tory or even envisage real-world applications. Another question
pertains to how transparent individuals and their internal (e.g.,
emotional, intentional, deceptive, etc.) states can ever be made,
even with a fine-grained analysis of human behavior or charac-
teristics, as individuals become aware of advancements in tech-
nologies to assess these. Drawing on the concept of measures and
countermeasures—can human suspicious behavior and intent be
camouflaged so well it is not traceable by the latest neuroscientific
detection systems? It is not yet clear to which extent the sophis-
tication of technology and human perception to assess human
mental and behavioral activity is juxtaposed with the sophisti-
cation of individuals to evade these security measures. Further,
fully successful detection systems would have human rights, pol-
icy making and social acceptance implications, a critical issue that
has been clearly recognized (see Mitchener-Nissen, 2013; Rusconi
and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013).
While the above methods investigate physiological or behav-
ioral indices with technological means and algorithms, the use
of human operators during incident or threat detection is still
irreplaceable and critical to the security discourse (see Howard
et al., 2013; Mendes et al., 2013; Stainer et al., 2013). This bears
the question on how secure we actually are as both technology
and humans are fallible in their decision making. It is, however,
generally assumed that the output of visualization techniques
such as CCTV and transmission x-rays can be appropriately
assessed by trained individuals. CCTV operators are presented
with large volumes of constantly updating visual information,
and the navigation through this temporal and spatial data feed is
very demanding. In transmission x-rays, the difficulty of complex
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image interpretation lies mostly in the superposition of several
two-dimensional projections and the unusual views by which
objects are seen in static images. To gather information about
human performance in security image interpretation, diamet-
rically opposite approaches can be adopted—from a classical
hypothesis-driven experimental method to an in situ observa-
tional method reminiscent of a cognitive-ethological approach
(Howard et al., 2013; Stainer et al., 2013). While technologi-
cal improvements are being pursued to increase the efficiency
of the screening process from an engineering and physics stand-
point, these efforts may be hindered by the intrinsic limitations
of the human visual perception system (see Mendes et al., 2013).
Notably, to the extent that decisions are made by people, the
assessment of potentially dangerous situations in a social envi-
ronment is subjected to the limitations of the cognitive system
that can be swayed or driven by appearances, biases, and previ-
ous experience (seeWatkins, 2013;Woody and Szechtman, 2013).
Of course, the same constraints will also apply to the decisions
made by those individuals who actively engage in criminal activi-
ties (i.e., those who create breaches in security rather than help
maintain it)—an awareness that seems yet to have been fully
incorporated in evidence-based crime science (Bouhana, 2013).
Brain manipulation techniques such as Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation and transcranial Direct Current Stimulation may
help overcome some of the intrinsic limitations of human security
operators with their potential to augment human performance in
a range of tasks (Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013; Parasuraman and
Galster, 2013). Although the state of the art may not be mature
enough to allow for direct translations into the security field, it
is of paramount importance that neuroscientists engage as early
as possible with professionals from other disciplines to formulate
critical appraisals of the larger-picture implications of any of the
envisaged uses (Brunelin et al., 2013; Sehm and Ragert’s, 2013).
Arguably, rather than hinder or slow down scientific progress,
these early multidisciplinary appraisals and interactions will help
secure more public support and more resources for neuroscience
research.
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